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ABSTRACT
This paper studies aggregate dynamics in a cobweb model where learning
takes place through a selection mecanism, by which more successful rms are
replicated at a higher rate. The structure of the model allows to characterize
analytically the aggregate dynamics, and to compute the e¤ect on welfare of
alternative levels of selectivity. A central aspect is that greater selectivity, while
bringing the distribution of rm types closer to the optimal one at a given date,
tends to make the economy less stable at the aggregate level.
As in Nelson and Winter (1982), rms di¤er in their labor/capital ratio.
They do not choose it optimally, rather it is a characteristic of a rm. The
distribution of rms evolves over time in a way that favors the most protable
rm types. Selection may be inadequate because rms are being selected on the
basis of incorrect market signals. Selection itself may reinforce such mispricing,
thus generating instability.
I compare economies that di¤er in the volatility and persistence of their
productivity shocks, as well as the elasticity of labor supply. The key ndings
are as follows.
First, a trade-o¤ arises since greater selection allows to better track shocks
and limits mutational drift in rm types; on the other hand, selection may
strengthen cobweb oscillatory dynamics.
Second, there seems to be a value in maintaining a diverse "ecology of rms",
in order to cope with future shocks.
These observations explain the key results. Optimal selectivity is larger,
the less "cobweb unstable" the economy, i.e. the more elastic the labor supply.
Second, optimal selectivity is larger, the more persistent the aggregate produc-
tivity shocks. Finally, optimal selectivity is larger, the lower the variance of
productivity innovations.
The model can be extended to allow for rm entry and trend productiv-
ity growth, and a selection process with memory. Empirical evidence suggests
This paper was presented at the PSE macro workshop, the University of Surrey, Munich
University, Ecole Polytechnique, and at the European Summer Symposium in Macroeco-
nomics, Izmir, May 2013.
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that, in accordance to the model, countries with less regulated product markets
exhibit lower aggregate inertia.
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1 Introduction
In most of macroeconomics, agents are considered as su ciently intelligent
to carry all required calculations and compute the rational expectations equi-
librium (REE). An important literature, however, questions that assumption
and tries to examine the extent to which the economy can "learn" such an
equilibrium1. In many cases, for example, a reduced form law of motion for
the variables of interest is postulated and the agents learn its parameters,
typically by using least squares or Bayesian techniques.
This paper asks the following question how does an economy behave,
when learning takes place through a Darwinian selection mechanism by which
less protable rms are eliminated and more protable ones replicate them-
selves? Does greater selection systematically bring the economy closer to the
rational expectations equilibrium? When it does not, what are the dynamic
properties of aggregate uctuations, and how does welfare depend on the
parameters that govern the selection process?
A naive "as if" argument would predict that the more selective the econ-
omy, the closer it is to the REE. Yet such an argument overlooks the fact that
the market signals that are driving selection need not be the correct ones,
because the environment in which selection takes place, as determined by
the current value of the shocks and the current distribution of the individual
rms characteristics, is not the same that will apply to the rms that have
been selected. Furthermore, selection of a given type of rm perturbs the
market signals in such a way that mistakes in the selection process can be
reinforced2.
I study these issues in the context of a simple partial equilibrium economy
1See for example Marcet and Sargent (1989), Evans and Honkahpoja (2001), Marcet
and Nicolini (2003).
2This issue arises in Saint-Paul (2007), in a model where competing rms set their
prices subj t to mistakes.
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with potential cobweb cycles. As in Nelson and Winter (1982), rms di¤er
in their labor/capital ratio. They do not choose it optimally, rather it is a
characteristic of a rm (that is, this behavior is hard wired in their DNA).
Firms whose labor/capital ratio is further away from the prot-maximizing
one are selected out. As a result the distribution of rms evolves over time in
a way that favors the most protable rm types. A single parameter, called
selectivity, captures how stringly the most protable types are favored.
Which rm type is most protable depends on current wages and on the
current realization of an aggregate productivity shocks. Therefore, selection
may be inadequate because di¤erent wages and productivity levels will pre-
vail in the future. Furthermore, excess selection may be destabilizing because
it may induce a cobweb cycle when wages are low the most labor-intensive
rms are selected, which leads to too high wages and too high labor demand
in the subsequent period, where the least labor-intensive rms will be se-
lected, thus intensifying the cycle. Such cycles illustrate that rms are being
selected on the basis of incorrect market signals and that selection itself also
contributes to this mispricing.
I compare economies that di¤er in the volatility and persistence of their
productivity shocks, as well as the elasticity of labor supply. For each of
those economies I can characterize their aggregate dynamics as a function
of their degree of selectivity. I can also compute aggregate welfare and the
selectivity level which maximizes that welfare.
The key ndings are as follows.
First, there is a trade-o¤ due to the fact that, on the one hand, greater
selection allows the economy to better track aggregate shocks (as long as they
have some persistence) and limits the mutational drift in the cross-sectional
variance of rm types; on the other hand, as ust pointed out, selection may
strengthen cobweb oscillatory dynamics, which leads to increased volatility
and potentially unstable dynamics.
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Second, there seems to be a value in maintaining a diverse "ecology of
rms", because the rm types that will be more adequate in future (un-
certain) environments have to be drawn from the pool of existing rms. If
selection is too extreme in the current environment, the rms that are best
adapted to a given future environmental change, yet performing poorly in
present circumstances, will be very scarce, and it will take longer for the
economy to produce a large number of such rms in the new environment.
These observations help us to understand the results. We nd that
 Optimal selectivity is larger, the less "cobweb unstable" the economy,
i.e. the more elastic the labor supply. This is because the more elastic
the labor supply, the less distorted the wage signals may be and the
more dampened the oscillations of the economy in response to an initial
misalignment in wages. Therefore, the less destabilizing a given degree
of selectivity will be. Indeed, if labor supply were innitely elastic, that
would pin down wages at their correct social value; they could not be
distorted by wrong decisions on the demand side of the labor market.
 Optimal selectivity is larger, the more persistent the aggregate produc-
tivity shocks. This is because selection that takes place now a¤ects the
distribution of rms in the future. If shocks are more persistent rms
that do better today are also more likely to do better in the future,
hence selectivity is more valuable.
 Optimal selectivity is larger, the lower the variance of productivity in-
novations. This is the "biodiversity" e¤ect. When productivity shocks
are more volatile, the future is more uncertain and this makes it more
valuable to keep a su cient mass of rms of various types, because it
is more likely that one of them will be the optimal one.
The model can also be extended to account for an endogenous capital
3
stock, economic growth, and a selection process "with memory", i.e. which
rewards past performance in addition to ust current performance. It is shown
that the optimal selectivity level should go up (resp. down) with economic
growth, if capital accumulation is unresponsive (resp. responsive) to growth.
Also, my numerical simulations indicate that if selectivity is chosen optimally,
faster growing economies will tend to have more volatile uctuations. Finally,
memory tends to raise the optimal level of selectivity, because it introduces
another mechanism for raising inertia.
While selection is governed by a mechanical process, its parameters can
be intuitively related to economic institutions. For example, we may think
that greater selectivity is the outcome of more competitive markets or more
stringent credit conditions. The results imply that which institutions work
best at delivering a sound macroeconomic performance depends on the struc-
ture of the shocks and of the productivity growth process faced by the econ-
omy. I provide some suggestive evidence that the nexus between institutions,
selectivity, and aggregate inertia may be at work in a cross-section of coun-
tries I show that there exists a positive correlation between the ranking of a
country in a number of indicators of product market regulation, on the one
hand, and its inertia in the aggregate labor/capital ratio, on the other hand.
This is consistent with the model provided one assumes that product market
regulations reduce selectivity.
2 Related literature
Selection naturally intervenes in all models where some relevant dimension
of economic activity is sub ect to an extensive margin (see for example o-
vanovic (1982), Caballero and Hammour (1994), M litz (2003)). However, as
long as agents optimize, such selection is ust a by-product of the existence
of nonconvexities and xed costs. The assumption that rms are rational
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optimizing agents is not adequate to analyze the central role of selection as
a mechanism for error correction in a capitalist economy3. By contrast in
models of bounded rationality and adaptive learning, selection is an essential
ingredient of the process by which the economy evolves.
This is not the rst paper which studies those issues in the context of
the cobweb model. Following the standard results of Ezekiel (1938) and
Muth (19 1), the literature has analyzed whether the cobweb cycle converges
depending on learning processes (Carlson (19 9), Bray and Savin (198 )).
More recently, Arifovic (1994) has addressed the same issue using genetic
algorithms, that is, applying Darwinian selection mechanisms to the learn-
ing strategies being used4. Her simulations indicate that, in the absence of
shocks, the economy generally converges to the rational expectations equi-
librium, even though the parameters may be such that it is cobweb-unstable.
Franke (1998), building on this work, provides a number of interesting simu-
lations that typically (but not systematically) imply that the economy does
not deviate much from the Walrasian equilibrium.
Our simple framework allows us to parametrize selectivity by a single
number, derive linear dynamics at the aggregate level, and compute the se-
lectivity parameters that deliver the highest welfare. The price to be paid is
that the strategies that the rms follow are xed (as in Arifovic (1994)) so
that the richer adaptive learning strategies of Franke (1998) are not consid-
3As pointed out by Caballero and Hammour (1 in general entry and exit will not
be e cient (as compared to some optimal benchmark) if there are market failures; this is
an instance of inadequate selection, but only as a consequence of the market failure.
4The Darwinian view according to which rms, rather than optimizing, are character-
ized by an array of xed business strategies that one may interpret as their "DNA" is
pervasive in the business literature. See for example Marks (2002).
To be sure, the strategies described in such a book are far more complex and qualitative
than st deciding o	e
s capital/labor ratio. Nevertheless they exemplify how capitalism
is a trial-and-error process through which unprotable behavioral rules are eventually
abandoned, while protable ones are replicated. This paper is a rst step at analyzing the
consequences of this trial-and-error process for aggregate dynamics.
ered5. Besides showing that greater selectivity reduces inertia and raises the
likelihood of unstable aggregate oscillations, this paper s key contribution is
to show how the optimal degree of selectivity depends on the economic en-
vironment, as dened by (i) the elasticities of supply and demand, (ii) the
volatility and persistence of aggregate shocks, (iii) the variance of mutations,
and (iv) the trend rate of productivity growth.
3 A simple selection process
There is a continuum of rms of total mass equal to one. Each rm i has
one unit of capital. Its production function at date t is
yit = Atl

i ;
where At is an aggregate productivity shock. Firms do not optimize, instead
their behavior is pinned down by their "type". Here this means that each
rm pursues a xed employment policy li: More generally this could stand
for various aspects of the "DNA" of a rm, such as managerial practices,
etc. Optimization then only takes place indirectly, through the way markets
select rms.
At date t; total labor supply is such that
wt = !L

t ;
where Lt is total employment and wt is the wage.
Given wt; the prot of a rm of type l at date t is given by
t(l) = Atl
   wtl:
Note however that Franks results themselves, somewhat fascinatingly, show that a
large proportion of rms survive following xed output strategies, despite the other rms
pursuing more exible behavioural rules.
The most protable rm type, at t, is the one such that
l = lt =

At
wt
 1
1 
:
I assume that the distribution of rm type at t is given by ft(x); where
x = ln l: ft() evolves over time for two reasons. First, rm types are sub ect
to random mutation. Second, selection by markets raises the frequency of
the most protable rms. This selection process is formalized as follows
the greater the distance between a rm type and the most protable type,
the more its frequency is reduced in the following period. More specically,
let xt = ln l

t and let 
2
t = V art(x) be the cross-sectional variance of the
distribution of log rm size: At the end of period t; random mutation takes
place, so that x is replaced by x+ "; where " is a random noise with density
h("): That is, the distribution of rm types at the end of period t is given by
gt(x) =
Z +

ft(y)h(x  y)dy:
After this mutation takes place, selection operates so as to favor the rm
types that were closer to the most protable one6. Hence the distribution at
the beginning of t+ 1 is given by
ft+1(x) =
gt(x) exp(  (x x

t )
2
2
)
Dt
; (1)
whereDt =
R
gt(x) exp(  (x x

t )
2
2
)dx: The parameter  captures the intensity
of selection. At  = 0 no selection takes place, and the distribution of rms
keeps spreading under the in uence of random mutations. At  = +1 only
rms that have the optimal employment level survive, and next period all
rms will have that type.
Strictly speaking, it would be more rigorous to assume that ft(x) is altered by a
multiplicative factor which is increasing in t(e
x); but replacing prots by the distance to
the optimal employment level is a handy approximation.
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The model is silent about how this selection process operates. There are
three potential margins imitation (by either new entrants or existing rms),
exit, and growth of the most successful rms. The relative importance of
these three margins is irrelevant here.
It is easy to see that if ft() is normal, i.e. ft(x) =
1
p
2t
exp(  (x xt)2
22t
); and
if h is normal, that is h(") = 1p
2m
exp(  "2
22m
); then so is ft+1: Furthermore
the mean log employment level then evolves according to
xt+1 =
xt +  (
2
t + 
2
m) x

t
1 +  (2t + 
2
m)
; (2)
while the variance of the distribution evolves according to
2t+1 =
2t + 
2
m
1 +  (2t + 
2
m)
: (3)
We are now in a position to solve for the equilibrium of this economy. It
will be useful to use the following parameters
 =

1  
and
d = 2m:
We have that
xt =
1
1   (ln + at   lnwt) ; (4)
where at = lnAt;
lnLt = lnEtl = Et ln l +
2t
2
= xt +
2t
2
: ( )
This determines the wage at t :
lnwt = 

xt +
2t
2

+ ln!: ( )
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Finally, substituting ( ) into (4) and then into (2) we get
xt+1 = bt +
 (2t + 
2
m)
(1 +  (2t + 
2
m))(1  )
at +
1     (2t + 2m)
(1 +  (2t + 
2
m))(1  )
xt; (7)
where
bt =
 (2t + 
2
m)
(1 +  (2t + 
2
m))(1  )

ln

!
  
2
t
2

:
Equations (7) and (3) characterize the dynamics of the system. While
they are non linear, the system is asymptotically univariate and linear.
This is because (3) implies that 2t evolves deterministically and converges
monotonically to
2

=  
2
m
2
+
p
4m + 4
2
m=
2
: (8)
This asymptotic cross-sectional dispersion of rms is larger, the greater
the "mutation rate" 2m and the smaller the selectivity parameter : It be-
comes innite as  ! 0 and nil as  !1:
Also, the deterministic (log) employment component bt converges to
b

=
2

1  

ln

!
  2

=2

(9)
Asymptotically, then, the evolution equation of x becomes
xt+1 = b +
2

(1  )at + xt; (10)
where
 =
2

2

+ 2m
  
2

1   =
p
1 + 4=d  1  2
1 +
p
1 + 4=d
: (11)
This formula shows the rst result of this paper
PROPOSITION 1 Assume the stochatic process for at is stationary.
The dynamics of xt are stable if and only if  >  1; or equivalently
1
d
>
 2   1
4
: (12)
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Furthermore, if
1
d
<  +  2; (13)
then the dynamics are oscillatory, i.e.  < 0.
PROOF The AR1 term, 
2

2

+2m
  2
1 
;is always < 1: Dynamics are
stable i¤ it is >  1: This is equivalent to  < 1 


1
2

+2m
+ 1
2


; which by
(8) is equivalent to (12). Dynamics are oscillatory i¤ 
2

2

+2m
  2
1 
< 0;i.e.
 < 1 

1
2

+2m
; which is equivalent to (13). ED
The case where  = +1 and where there are no shocks delivers the
standard cobweb cycle (Ezekiel, 1938) by selecting only the most protable
rm at t; markets set labor demand a t + 1 at the level that corresponds to
wages at t; if wages are high at t; employment is low at t + 1; and wages
are low at t + 1: It is well known that this cycle converges if and only if
 < 1   ; i.e.  < 1: Indeed, if  < 1; (12) always holds. In the sequel I
will label an eonomy such that the cobweb cycle converges "cobweb-stable".
Furthermore, the greater  ; the greater the absolute value of the root of such
a cycle. Hence  is an index of cobweb instability.
As shown by Proposition 1, if the economy is cobweb-stable, then it is
even more stable under nite selectivity. Otherwise, it will be stable provided
selectivity remains below a given threshold. The economy is more stable,
the lower its selectivity and the lower the mutation rate. Therefore, the
selectivity threshold below which the economy is stable is lower, the greater
the mutation rate. In generating instablility, mutation plays a somewhat
similar role as selectivity. A greater mutation rate means that the pool of
rms pursuing today s optimal policy rather than yesterday s will be larger,
which increases the number of rms that will pursue this policy tomorrow,
and therefore the likelihood of instability.
If we interpret, plausibly, economies with a larger  or a larger mutation
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rate as being more of the "capitalist" kind, then Proposition 1 provides some
foundations for the often heard claim that "capitalist economies are inher-
ently instable". This instability comes from the fact that selection takes
place on the basis of incorrect prices that is, on the basis on wages at t;
instead of the REE wages at t+1 and by inducing too many rms to adopt
the incorrect type, prices next period are made even more incorrect.
Suppose now a central planner wants to choose how capitalist the economy
is, i.e. what the optimal value of  should be. This central planner can be
viewed as a metaphor for the outcome of "systems competition" la Sinn
(2003). That is, it is reasonable to assume that economies that do poorly will
eventually adopt the institutions of economies that do well. By looking at the
optimum, I am silent about the way this macro-selection process operates,
as the model is equally silent about how the selectivity parameter  relates
to actual institutions.
Our central planner clearly faces a trade-o¤ the economy is more stable
when  is lower, on the other hand it takes longer for it to learn the correct
price, and it is less reactive to shocks. Finally, a lower value of  also raises the
asymptotic dispersion of rm size because less selective pressure is exerted
against mutations. The central planner would want all rms to choose the
Walrasian employment level (which also maximizes total surplus) given by
xt =
1
1 
(ln + at   lnwt) and lnwt = xt; that is
~xt =
1
1   +  (ln + at): (14)
I assume that the central planner s welfare is given by
E
+X
t=0
t ln(St +t);
where St is the workers surplus and t total prots. It is shown (Appendix
1) that maximizing this expression can be approximated by the following
problem
11
minE
+X
t=0
t(2t + (1 + )(xt   ~xt)2): (1 )
I assume that at follows an AR1 process
at = at 1 + "t; (1 )
with "t  N(0; 2"): Furthermore, the central planner acts "asymptotically"
by minimizing the long-term welfare ow on the RHS of (1 ). That is, the
government minimizes limt! 
2
t + (1 + )E(xt   ~xt)2;which is equal to
L =2

+ (1 + )((Eu)2 + V ar(u)); (17)
where ut = xt ~xt is the "average log size gap" (ALSG), that is, the di¤erence
between the average log size of a rm in our economy and the (common to
all rms) log size in the Walrasian economy. The preceding derivations allow
us to characterize the law of motion for the ALSG
ut+1 = u  1
1   +  "t+1 +
1  
1   +  at + ut; (18)
where
u =  
2
4

: (19)
From the RHS of (17), we see that the asymptotic losses to the social
planner come from three sources
1. The cross-sectional dispersion of rm size, given by
2

=
2m
2
( 1 +
p
1 + 4=d): (20)
This is larger, the larger the mutation rate and the smaller the selectivity
level.
2. The average output gap, given by
Eu =
u
1   : (21)
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This formula tells us that the average mistake made by a rm setting
employment in this economy compared to the Walrasian one is larger, the
more cobweb-unstable (the larger ) and the less selective (the lower ) the
economy. Why is that so? The average output gap is negative (meaning
rms on average are too small compared to the Walrasian allocation) because
log rm size dispersion per se tends to raise aggregate employment due to
ensen s inequality7. This tends to raise wages above the Walrasian level,
which reduces average log rm employment. This e¤ect is stronger, the
greater the reaction of wages to employment, i.e. the greater the instability
 ; and the greater the asymptotic cross sectional variance of log employment,
i.e. the lower the selectivity parameter d:
3. The volatility of the ALSG, given by
V ar(u) =
2"
(1   + )2
2
(1 + )(1 + )(1  ) : (22)
3.0.1 The e¤ect of  and 
Table 1 reports the optimal value of d as a function of  and  for a typical
set of simulations. The other parameters have been set to  = 0:5; 2" = 0:02
and 2m = 0:05: The optimal value of d is driven by the trade-o¤ between
long-term cross-sectional dispersion in rms type and aggregate stability of
employment dynamics. Two key patterns emerge.
First, optimal selectivity is larger, the more persistent the productivity
shocks. This is because the more persistent those shocks, the more the most
protable rms at date t are likely to be the optimal rm type in the subse-
quent periods. Note that even if the shocks are not persistent some selectivity
7By the same token, log rm size dispersion would tend to push aggregate employment
above its Walrasian level. But we have proved that the social planns obtive can be
expressed as a function of the cross-sectional deviation of log rm size and the absolute
value of the output gap. Thus taking those into account we can ignore employment.
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is optimal, since otherwise mutations would accumulate and the dispersion of
rm types would become innite, which is ine cient. Furthermore, as long
as it is not strong enough to generate instability, some selectivity brings the
rm types in line with the correct ones on average.
Second, the greater  ; i.e. the more cobweb-unstable the economy, the
lower the selectivity level. The greater  ; the more wages react to a deviation
in aggregate employment, and the greater the welfare loss in subsequent
periods from picking the wrong rm type at a given date. Since selection
never operates on the basis of the correct market signals, one is more willing
to mitigate it when  is larger. We can also note that when  is large,
selectivity is very inelastic to the degree of persistence in productivity shocks.
n 0 0.2 0. 1 2
0.01 1.8 1.08 0. 1 0.32 0.14 0.03
0.2 3.7 1. 3 0.79 0.37 0.1 0.03
0.4 13.3 2. 7 1.00 0.43 0.1 0.03
0. 99 4.2 1.27 0.47 0.1 0.03
0.8 99 . 9 1. 0. 2 0.18 0.03
0.99 99 11. 1.7 0. 0.18 0.03
Table 1 Optimal value of d as a function of  and ;  = 0:5; 2" = 0:02,
2m = 0:05:
Table 2a reports the corresponding value of ; the AR1 coe cient in
aggregate employment dynamics. Note that this is not the autocorrelation
in xt; but instead the part of it that is induced by selectivity (the other part
comes from the autocorrelation in the shocks a). Under  = +1 it would be
equal to   : As Table 2a makes clear, this contribution is most of the time
negative. Table 2b reports the autocorrelation of average log employment xt;
which is equal to +
1+
:8 We see that in some cases it is optimal to pick d so as
8This is due to the fact that if x^t = xt   Ex; then x^t+1 = d1  a^t + x^t; so that
V ar(x^t) =
d2(1+)2
"
(1 )2(1 )(1 2)
and Ex^tx^t+1 = V ar(x^t) +
d22
"
(1 )2(1 )(1 ) :
14
to allow for negative autocorrelation. This is the case for  not too large and
 large. In other cases the optimal choice of d will increase the persistence of
employment relative to its Walrasian counterpart (where it is simply equal
to ). Note also that empirically observing a positive autocorrelation, i.e.
+
1+
> 0; does not preclude the endogenous dynamics of employment to be
oscillatory, i.e.  < 0:
n 0 0.2 0. 1 2
0.01 0.28 0.12 -0.07 -0.28 -0. 4 -0.77
0.2 0.18 0.02 -0.1 -0.3 -0. 9 -0.77
0.4 0.07 -0.07 -0.24 -0.42 -0. 9 -0.77
0. 0.01 -0.17 -0.32 -0.47 -0. -0.77
0.8 0.01 -0.24 -0.38 -0. 1 -0.71 -0.77
0.99 0.01 -0.30 -0.41 -0. -0.71 -0.77
Table 2a Persistence parameter  at the optimal choice of d: Same
parameters as Table 1.
n 0 0.2 0. 1 2
0.01 0.29 0.13 -0.0 -0.27 -0. 3 -0.77
0.2 0.37 0.22 0.0 0.1 -0.4 -0. 8
0.4 0.4 0.33 0.18 0.03 -0.2 -0. 4
0. 0. 1 0.47 0.3 0.18 -0.08 -0.32
0.8 0.8 0.70 0. 1 0.48 0.22 0.07
0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.94 0.92
Table 2b Employment autocorrelation at the optimal choice of d: Same
parameters as Table 1
Table 3 reports the corresponding asymptotic cross-sectional dispersion
of rm size, 

; while Table 4 reports the average ALSG. Given (20), the
interpretation of Table 3 is straightforward. Table 4 conrms the negative
e¤ects of rm size dispersion which is discussed above. As selectivity reduces
dispersion, it also reduces the size of the ALSG.
1
n 0 0.2 0. 1 2
0.01 0.019 0.03 0.044 0.0 7 0.11 0.2
0.2 0.011 0.02 0.037 0.0 1 0.11 0.2
0.4 0.003 0.01 0.031 0.0 0.11 0.2
0. 0.000 0.009 0.02 0.0 2 0.10 0.2
0.8 0.000 0.007 0.023 0.049 0.097 0.2
0.99 0.000 0.004 0.021 0.04 0.097 0.2
Table 3 Cross-sectional log employment variance at the optimal choice
of d: Same parameters as Table 1
n 0 0.2 0. 1 2
0.01 0 -0.4 -1.1 -2.2 -4. -11.8
0.2 0 -0.3 -0.9 -2.0 -4.3 -11.8
0.4 0 -0.2 -0.8 -1.8 -4.3 -11.8
0. 0 -0.1 -0. -1.7 -4.0 -11.8
0.8 0 -0.1 -0. -1. -3.9 -11.8
0.99 0 -0.0 -0. -1. -3.9 -11.8
Table 4 Average ALSG ( ) at the optimal choice of d: Same parameters
as Table 1
3.0.2 The e¤ect of 2m and 
2
":
How do the variances of mutations and aggregate shocks a¤ect the optimal
selectivity level? We can again answer this question by running numerical
simulations. Also, in some special cases we can get an analytical solution.
For  =  = 0 we have that
Eu = 0
and
V ar(u) =
2"
(1  )2
2
1 + 
;
1
while it is always true that
2
ﬀ
=
2m
1   :
Therefore, one replace the choice variable by  and the asymptotic ob ec-
tive is
min

2m
2(1  ) +
22"
(1  2)(1 + ) :
The optimal value of  is
 =
2"   (1  )m
2" + (1  )m
and the corresponding value of d is9
d =

2"
(1  )22m
  1
4

 1
if 2" > (1  )m
= +1 if 2"  (1  )m:
This expression suggests that optimal selectivity is a decreasing function
of the "=m ratio. The greater the variance of productivity shocks, the
greater the "biodiversity" value of maintaining a large enough pool of rms
at various employment level, in order to better react to future "changes in
the environment", i.e. productivity shocks that call for a change in the
optimal rm size. One can also show, based on the preceding formula, that
d=d2m > 0: Thus selectivity clearly goes up with the variance of mutational
shocks. Bigger mutations raise the long-term cross sectional dispersion of
rm size, which induces an increase in selectivity so as to limit the associated
welfare losses.
Are these results conrmed in more general parameter congurations? To
answer that question we again have to use numerical simulations. Figure 1
shows the evolution of d as a function of 2" for  = 0:5 and twelve di¤erent
9As  =
p
1+4=d 1
1+
p
1+4=d
; if the optimal  is negative, it cannot be reached by picking d: I
such cases, one cannot to better than setting d = +1:
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set of parameter values for 2m;  and : These values are reported in Table
.
Simul. 2m  
1 0.0 0.2 0.2
2 0.0 0.2 0.
3 0.0 0.2 0.8
4 0.0 0.8 0.2
0.0 0.8 0.
0.0 0.8 0.8
7 0.1 0.2 0.2
8 0.1 0.2 0.
9 0.1 0.2 0.8
10 0.1 0.8 0.2
11 0.1 0.8 0.
12 0.1 0.8 0.8
Table Parameter values for Figure 1
As Figure 1 reports an inverse measure of d (1=(1 + d)), it conrms our
intuition that selectivity falls with the variance of productivity shocks.
Figure 2 reports the evolution of  as a function of 2m: The corresponding
parameter values are reported on Table 7. We see that selectivity goes up
with 2m for low values of  but falls with 
2
m for large values of :
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Simul. 2"  
1 0.02 0.2 0.2
2 0.02 0.2 0.
3 0.02 0.2 0.8
4 0.02 0.8 0.2
0.02 0.8 0.
0.02 0.8 0.8
7 0.04 0.2 0.2
8 0.04 0.2 0.
9 0.04 0.2 0.8
10 0.04 0.8 0.2
11 0.04 0.8 0.
12 0.04 0.8 0.8
Table 7 Parameter values for Figure 2
How can we explain this pattern? For a given ; an increase in the size of
mutations makes the cross-sectional distribution of rm size less persistent,
which in turn reduces the persistence parameter : For  < 0 this makes ag-
gregate dynamics more unstable, with the associated welfare losses captured
by (22). This e¤ect is stronger, the more negative ; i.e. the greater  : To
o¤set it, one must pick a lower value of : This e¤ect dominates for  large
enough, explaining the negative dependence of  on 2m: On the other hand,
for  low, the dynamics are unlikely to be oscillatory, and the contribution
of 
ﬁ
dominates selectivity goes up when mutations are larger, to o¤set the
increase in the long run cross-sectional dispersion of rm size.
4 Extensions
4.1 Endogenous number of rms and the e¤ect of growth
In the above model, the number of rms is xed. In this section I make
it more general by endogenizing the number of rms. This extension will
then prove convenient to analyze the consequences of the introduction of an
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exogenous growth trend in total factor productivity.
I assume that a fraction s of total output is saved (as in the Solow (19 )
model), and that these savings are used to accumulate capital, which means
more rms here. But instead of a linear relationship between savings and
capital accumulation, I assume that it is non linear and sub ect to decreasing
returns to scale, so that the following relationship holds
Kt+1 = Y
 
t ; (23)
with  2 [0; 1]: In general  should depend on s; but this dependency is
immaterial, and we ignore it here. The above model is a special case for
s = 0;  = 1 and  = 0: The  parameter captures how sensitive the number
of rms is to the output level. The evolution of the distribution of rm size
is unchanged from the previous analysis, meaning that the RHS of (1) drives
the distribution of rm size among new entrants as well as survivors.
We clearly have that Yt = AtKtEtl

i : Taking logs and denoting by yt =
lnYt, this clearly implies that
yt = at + kt + xt + 
2
2
t
2
: (24)
Similarly, Lt = KtEtli and therefore
lnLt = kt + xt +
2t
2
:
This equation allows us to derive the equilibriumwage and prot-maximizing
log rm size, that are respectively equal to
lnwt = ln! + (kt + xt +
2t
2
)
and
xt =
1
1  (ln

!
+ at   (kt + xt + 
2
t
2
)):
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Using the same derivations as in Section 3 we get the aymptotic law of
motion for xt :
xt+1 = (1  2
ﬂ
(1 + ))xt   2
ﬂ
kt +
2
ﬂ
1  at + bﬂ; (2 )
where b
ﬂ
is dened by (9).
Using (23) we also get an evolution equation for kt = lnKt :
kt+1 =  at +  kt +  xt + cﬂ; (2 )
where
c
ﬂ
= ln  +
 22
ﬂ
2
:
Proposition 2 characterizes the stability properties of the dynamical sys-
tem (2 -2 ), thus extending Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 The dynamical system (2 -2 ) is stable if and only if
1
d
>

+ 
1+ 
2
  1
4
: (27)
Proof See Appendix
We note that (27) is more likely to hold, the greater  : the more en-
try is sensitive to economic activity, the more stable the economy. Capital
accumulation raises inertia, making it less likely that the economy oscillates.
The preceding extension can be applied to an economy where TFP at has
a deterministic growth trend. More specically, I assume that at = aCt + gt;
where g is the trend growth rate and aCt the cyclical component. I assume
that the law of motion for aCt is given by the same AR1 process as above,
i.e. eq. (1 ).
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We want to know how the optimal selectivity depends on growth; we also
want to know how this dependence a¤ects the economy s cyclical properties.
For this we rst need to extend the welfare criterion derived in (17) to the case
with an endogenous capital stock. This is done in the Appendix. Then, in
order to compute social welfare, one needs to compute the stochastic steady
state moments of the relevant vector (kt; xt; at): The relevant formulas are
also derived in the Appendix. One can then use those formulas to compute
the welfare-maximizing level of d: The next table shows how it depends on
g and  : The other parameters were  = 0:5;  = 1; s = 0:5;  = 0:5; ! =
1;  = 0:01; 2" = 0:02 and 
2
m = 0:05:
gn 0 0.2 0. 0.7 0.9 1 2/3
0 0. 1 0. 4 0.47 0.4 0.4 0.47 0.4
0.02 0. 1 0. 9 0. 0.43 0.01 0.01 0.4
0.0 0. 7 0. 7 0. 1 0.39 0.01 0.01 0.4
0.1 0.79 0.79 0.72 0.32 0.01 0.01 0.4
0.1 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.2 0.01 0.01 0.4
0.2 1.13 1.13 1.0 0.19 0.01 0.01 0.4
Table 8 Optimal d as a function of g and  
To interpret Table 8, one should rst note that the deterministic growth
component of the average log rm size is equal to (see Appendix)
gx = g
1   (1 + (1  ))
(1  )(1 +     (1 + (1  ))) :
This component is the same in our equilibrium and in the Walrasian one
our economy does not diverge from its Walrasian counterpart over time.
If  < 1
1+(1 )
; gx is positive and grows with g : the capital stock is not
responsive enough to trend growth for the size distribution of rms to remain
constant. Firm size grows over time. We have seen in Table 4 that rm size
is typically smaller, on average, than the Walrasian benchmark. Since the
distribution of rm size that produces at t + 1 is selected from the pool of
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rms at date t; an increase in g tends to widen the gap between the average
rm size at t and its Walrasian counterpart. This raises the gain to the social
planner of being more selective, because greater selectivity reduces the ALSG
Eu in absolute value; as illustrated by (19) and (21).
For  > 1
1+(1 )
; however, entry "overshoots" the level that would deliver
a constant distribution of x through time. As a result, the average rm size
shrinks over time, more so, the greater g: The lag in rm selection now tends
to o¤set the fact that the ALSG is smaller in our equilibrium than in the
Walrasian one. This o¤setting factor is stronger, the greater g: Therefore, as
g goes up, the ALSG shrinks in absolute value, which reduces the benets of
selectivity.
Finally, for  = 1
1+(1 )
; both our economy and the Walrasian one are
in a balanced growth path where the cross-sectional distribution of rm size
(which is degenerate in the Walrasian case) has no deterministic trend. As
a result the growth rate has no impact on the ALSG and consequently no
impact on the optimal selectivity level. For our parameter values this corre-
sponds to  = 2=3 and is reported in the last column of Table 8.
gn 0 0.2 0. 0.7 0.9 1 2/3
0 0.00 0.010 0.023 0.039 0.072 0.103 0.03
0.02 0.00 0.011 0.023 0.039 0.07 0.1 9 0.03
0.0 0.00 0.011 0.024 0.039 0.07 0.1 9 0.03
0.1 0.007 0.012 0.02 0.038 0.07 0.1 9 0.03
0.1 0.008 0.013 0.02 0.037 0.07 0.1 9 0.03
0.2 0.009 0.014 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.1 9 0.03
Table 9 Output volatility as a function of g and  
Table 9 reports the corresponding volatility of output. For  < 1
1+(1 )
=
2=3; selectivity grows with g; and we observe that this is associated with an
increase in volatility. For  = 0 this is due to the increase in the absolute
value of the negative root, i.e. an amplication of the cobweb cycle, as
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discussed above. For  > 0 the roots are complex and the results are more
di cult to interpret. Overall, though, the results suggest that economies
that grow faster should be more volatile, although this is not systematic (see
column ).
4.2 Selection with memory
I now study an extension of the model where selection takes place on the
basis of current and past protability, instead of current protability alone.
Intuitively, this means that investors have a "long memory" and that the
rms that are selected for are those that have a greater prot over some
period of time10. A natural way to formalize this is to assume that instead
of (1) we have
ft+1(x) =
gt(x) exp(  (x x^t)
2
2
)
Dt
; (28)
,where the most selected type is a geometric weighted average of current and
past most protable types
x^t = x^t 1 + (1  )xt
= x^t 1 +
1  
1   (ln + at   lnwt) :
 is a parameter which captures the memory, or horizon, of the selection
process. It is obvious that (3) is unchanged and that in (2) xt has to be re-
placed by x^t: Consequently, asymptotically we end up with a two dimensional
system which evolves as
10
Kﬃﬃing track of memory can be implemented in the economy through institutions
such as money, or more generally, wealth. See Kocherlakota (1998).
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xt+1 =
 
 1 +
p
1 + 4=d
1 +
p
1 + 4=d
!
xt +
d
2
( 1 +
p
1 + 4=d)x^t
x^t+1 =

  (1  )d
2
( 1 +
p
1 + 4=d)

x^t   (1  )
 
 1 +
p
1 + 4=d
1 +
p
1 + 4=d
!
xt
 (1  )
2
m
4
( 1 +
p
1 + 4=d) +
1  
1   (ln + at+1) ;
We can already analyze how the stability of the system is a¤ected by the
selection process parameters (; ): The following proposition can be proved.
Proposition 3 A su cient condition for the system to be stable is
 >
  
p
1 + 4=d
 +
p
1 + 4=d
: (29)
PROOF See Appendix 2.
We note that this condition is satised for any  provided  <
p
1 + 4=d;
which is equivalent to condition (12). Condition (12) is associated with
the special case  = 0: Intuitively, the longer the memory of the selection
process, the less likely it is that the economy will oscillate and the more likely
it is to be stable11. A longer memory thus enhances the range of selectivity
values compatible with stability the trade-o¤ between selectivity and inertia
is eased. As (29) makes clear, the maximum level of selectivity consistent
with stability becomes innite as  converges to 1.
11From the Proof of Proposition 3, we can partition the (; ) plane in various regions.
Negative roots prevail for high values of  and low values of : If the economy is cobweb
unstable, there is a region where  is too large and  too low for these oscillations to be
stable. But there is also a region where they are dampened. For  larger and  smaller,
the roots are positive and the economy is always stable. Finally there is a region where the
roots are complex, and in this case the economy is again stable, with dampened oscillations
at a frequency lower than a 2-cycle.
2
It is then natural to expect that the optimal selectivity level will depend
positively on the length of memory : The following Table reports simulations
of the optimal d for di¤erent values of  and ; and it conrms this intuition:12
n 0 0.2 0. 1 2
0.0 1.8 1.08 0. 1 0.32 0.14 0.03
0.2 .2 2.33 1.13 0. 0.2 0.0
0.4 99 13.3 3.17 1.28 0. 2 0.14
0. 99 99 99 . 9 1. 0.3
0.8 99 99 99 99 99 2.12
0.99 99 99 99 99 99 99
Table 10 Optimal selectivity d as a function of  and ;  = 0:5;
2m = 0:05; 
2
" = 0:5;  = 0:01
5 An empirical illustration
While the preceding discussion obviously rests on a very specic model, which
ignores many features of an economy as well as many dimensions of a rm s
characteristics upon which selection may take place, it is interesting to il-
lustrate empirically one key proposition emerging from the above analysis,
namely that there is a negative relationship between the intensity of selection
and the degree of inertia at the macroeconomic level.
While how to measure selection in a real economy is open to discussion,
I am more particularly interested in documenting the view that some insti-
tutions such as barriers to entry, lack of investor protection, etc, are likely to
reduce the selection level. If the above analysis is correct, we should expect
countries with more regulated markets to exhibit a higher level of macroeco-
nomic inertia.
My strategy is to use the Penn World Table to estimate a simple version
12How to compute the welfare criterion is described in the Appendix.
2
of Equation (2) for a number of countries13, and correlate the implied inertia
in x (measured as the labor/capital ratio from the PWT) with some indices
of product market regulation from the OECD product market regulation
database. I remain relatively agnostic regarding the determinants of the
preceding period s optimal value of x; and I proxy it by a set of three variables
TFP, the real wage, and the real exchange rate. The coe cient of interest is
the degree of inertia, i.e. the coe cient on the lagged value of x: According
to the model, it should be equal to
0 =
1
1 +  (2
 
+ 2m)
=
p
1 + 4=d  1p
1 + 4=d+ 1
:
This is clearly decreasing from 1 to 0 as d goes up from zero to innity.
I then rank the countries by this estimated persistence coe cient (hence
more highly ranked countries are interpreted as being more selective) and
correlate this with their rank in a number of OECD indices of product market
regulation. The results are reported in Table 11.
Indicator Rank correlation with 0
State control 0.22 (0.1)
Barriers to entrepreneurship 0.24 (0.11)
Barriers to international trade -0.1 (0.11)
Regulation of legal professions 0.14 (0.11)
Regulation of retail trade 0.3 (0.1)
Regulation of energy, transport and communication 0.28 (0.11)
Table 11 Mean rank correlation between estimated inertia and OECD
indicators of product market correlation. Standard deviations in parentheses.
Both means and standard deviations estimated with bootstrap simulations
to account for the sampling error in the estimation of 0.
We see that the rank correlation, although not very large is generally
positive, reaching 0.3 for retail trade. The only indicator that exhibits a
13See the Appendix for the actual specication and the estimated values for inertia.
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negative correlation with inertia is that of barriers to international trade.
However while this type of regulation forces domestic prices to deviate from
international prices, there is no reason to believe that it would reduce the
severity of selection among domestic rms, contrary to the other indicators.
That this indicator, unlike the others, is not positively correlated with the
degree of inertia, therefore comes as no surprise.
While these results hardly constitute a proof of the model (we can think
of mechanisms other than selection through which regulation would a¤ect
inertia), they are consistent with its general message that there exists a link
between selectivity at the micro level and inertia at the macro level.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have developed a model that allows us to study the inter-
actions between the intensity of selection at the microeconomic level and
aggregate dynamics, as well as to discuss what level of selectivity is most de-
sirable depending on the economic environment. This exercise has its limits
because it assumes a mechanical rule for the evolution of the cross-sectional
distribution of rm characteristics. This is the price to be paid for analytical
transparency. An important direction for future research consists in provid-
ing foundations for the selection mechanism based on real world institutions
such as the rules governing bankruptcies and corporate governance, as well
as labor and product market regulations.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Derivation of (15).
The workers surplus is equal to
St = wtLt   !t L
1+
t
1 + 
:
Therefore
t + St = Yt   !t L
1+
t
1 + 
: (30)
Furthermore
Yt = At
Z +"
#"
ft(x)e
xdx:
Therefore
lnYt = at + lnEl

= at + xt + 
2
2
t
2
:
Similarly
lnLt = xt + 
2
t=2:
For convenience we rewrite (14)
~xt =
1
1   +  (ln + at   zt):
Using this and the preceding derivations, (30) can be rewritten as
t + St = A
1+
1 +
t !
 

1 +
t 

1 + exp((xt   ~xt) + 2
2
t
2
)
 A
1+
1 +
t !
 

1 +
t

1+
1 +
1 + 
exp((1 + )(xt   ~xt + 
2
t
2
)):
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This is equivalent to
ln (t + St) =
1 + 
1   +  at  

1   +  +

1   +  ln
+(xt   ~xt; 
2
t
2
);
where
(u; v) = ln

exp(u+ 2v)  
1 + 
exp((1 + )(u+ v))

:
We note that for v  0; (u; v)  (0; 0) = ln(1   
1+
); that $u(0; 0) =
0; $v(0; 0) =  (1 )1  
1+
< 0; and $$u;u(0; 0) =  (1+) 
2
1  
1+
: Hence for u; v << 1
(u; v)  ln(1  
1 + 
)  (1  )
1  
1+

v + (1 + ) u2=2

:
The other terms of the Taylor expansion are all negligible relative to
either u or v:Maximization of E is therefore equivalent to minimizing E(v+
(1 + ) u2=2) = 1
2
(2
%
+ (1 + )Eu2)
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7.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The relevant matrix to be studied is, from (2 )-(2 )
M =

1  2
&
(1 + )  2
&
   

:
Let x = 2
&
2 [0; 1]: The eigenvalues  of M are solution to
2   [ + 1  x(1 + )]+  (1  x(1 + )) = 0: (31)
The corresponding discriminant is
(x) = [ + 1  x(1 + )]2   4 (1  x(1 + )) :
This quantity is positive i¤
0 < x2(1 + )2 + 2x(   (1 + )   (   2)) + (1   )2
It is easy to see that   (1+)  ( 2) =  b2 < 0 for all  2 [0; 1] and
that 2 = (   (1 + )   (   2))2   (1   )2(1 + )2 2 (0; b22): Therefore
we have that (x) < 0 for x 2 (x1; x2); with x1 = b2 
'
2
(1+)2
; x2 =
b2+
'
2
(1+)2
:
Straightforward computations show that 0 < x1 < x2 < 1: Furthermore,
x2 <
2(1+  + ( 2))
(1+)2
: Computations show that this quantity is smaller than
x =
1 +  
1 +  +  (1 + )
:
In the zone where x 2 (x1; x2); the two roots of (31) are complex con ugate
since (x) < 0: Their module is equal to  (1  x(1 + )) < 1: Therefore the
system is stable. In the zone where x =2 (x1; x2); the roots of (31) are real
and given by
1 =
1 +    x(1 + ) 
p
(x)
2
;
2 =
1 +    x(1 + ) +
p
(x)
2
:
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We can check that 2 < 1: As for 1; it must be greater than  1 for the
system to be stable. This is equivalent to
3 +    x(1 + ) >
p
(x):
This inequality is violated if x  3+ 
1+
: Suppose that x < 3+ 
1+
: Then the
preceding inequality is equivalent to
(3 +    x(1 + ))2 > (x):
Rearranging, this latter condition is equivalent to
x < x: (32)
Since, on the one hand, x < 3+ 
1+
; and, on the other hand, x > x2 and
the system is stable for x 2 (x1; x2); it follows that the system is stable i¤
(32) holds. Then, we note that x =  d+
(
d2+4d
2
; substituting into (??) and
rearranging, we get that the system is stable i¤
1
d
>

+ 
1+ 
2
  1
4
:
As  > ; this is more likely to hold, the greater  :
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7.3 Computing social welfare in the model with en-
dogenous capital
Relative to Appendix 1, consumption now di¤ers from output. We have to
subtract savings from it. Therefore, the ow of total welfare is given by
ln (t + St   sYt) = ln((1  s)Yt   ! L
1+
t
1 + 
):
We follow the approach of Appendix 1 and express welfare as a function
of the moments of the deviation between the endogenous variables xt; kt and
their Walrasian counterparts, denoted by ~xt and ~kt: In the Walrasian equilib-
rium with wages equal to ~wt; we clearly have that ~xt =
1
1 
(ln + at   ln ~wt)
and ln ~wt = ln! + (kt + xt): Therefore,
~xt =
1
1   + 

ln

!
+ at   ~kt

: (33)
The law of motion for capital in the Walrasian equilibrium is
~kt+1 = ln  +  ~kt +  at +  ~xt: (34)
For convenience we reproduce our dynamical system
xt+1 = (1  2
)
(1 + ))xt   2
)
kt +
2
)
1  at + b); (3 )
kt+1 =  at +  kt +  xt + c): (3 )
It is easy to compute the trend growth rates for x and k from those
equations. One gets
gx = g
1   (1 + (1  ))
(1  )(1 +     (1 + (1  )))
and
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gk = g
 (1 + (1  ))
(1  )(1 +     (1 + (1  ))) > 0:
One can also check from (33) and (34) that the trend growth rates of ~xt
and ~kt+1 are the same.
Let x^ = x  ~x and k^ = k   ~k: Then we have that
Yt = exp(kt + at + xt + 
22
*
=2)
= exp(~kt + at + ~xt) exp(k^t + x^t + 
22
*
=2):
Similarly,
L1+t = exp((1 + )(~kt + ~xt)) exp((1 + )(k^t + x^t + 
2
*
=2)):
Now using (33) we get that
~kt + at + ~xt =

1   +  ln

!
+Mt
and
(1 + )(~kt + ~xt) =
1 + 
1   +  ln

!
+Mt;
where
Mt =
1 + 
1   +  at +
(1 + ) (1  )
1   + 
~kt:
Clearly, then,
(1 s)Yt ! L
1+
t
1 + 
=

!
 
1 +
expMt:

(1  s) exp(kt + at + xt + 22
*
=2)
  
1+
exp((1 + )(k^t + x^t + 
2
*
=2))

:
Only the expression in brackets depends on : Therefore, maximizing
ln (t + St   sYt) is equivalent to maximizing that term. Denoting this term
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by exp(); computing its second-order Taylor expansion and keeping only
terms of order 0,1, and 2 in (k^; x^; 
+
) we get
exp 

1  s  
1 + 

1  a1k^ + a2x^+ a32
+
+ a4k^
2 + a5x^
2 + a6x^k^

;
(37)
where
a1 =
1  s  
1  s  =(1 + )
a2 =
 s
1  s  =(1 + )
a3 =
2 (1  s)  
2 (1  s  =(1 + ))
a4 =
1  s  (1 + )
2(1  s  =(1 + ))
a5 =
2 (1  s)  (1 + )
2(1  s  =(1 + ))
a6 =
 (s+ )
1  s  =(1 + ) :
Applying again a second-order Taylor expansion for ln(1+x) to (37) and
taking expectations we get, neglecting again terms of order greater than 2
E  ln

1  s  
1 + 

+ a1Ek^ + a2Ex^+ a3
2
+
(38)
+

a5   a
2
2
2

Ex^2 +

a4   a
2
1
2

Ek^2 + (a6   a1a2)Ek^x^:
This is the quantity being maximized in the numerical simulations.
To compute the moments that appear in the RHS of (38) we use the
following 4-dimensional system
k^t+1 =  k^t +  x^t +  
2
2
+
2
(39)
3
x^t+1 =

 
4
,
2
+
    1
1   +  g

+

 
1   + aCt  
1
1   + aCt+1

 2
,
k^t + (1  2
,
(1 + ))x^t +
 
1   + 
~kt +
 
1   + ~xt(40)
~kt+1 =  ~kt +  ~xt +  (g +aCt) (41)
~xt+1 =
1   
1   +  g +

1
1   + aCt+1  
 
1   + aCt

(42)
   
1   + 
~kt    
1   + 
~kt
To get (39), subtract (34) from (3 ). To get (41), subtract (34) lagged
once from itself. To get (42), subtract (33) at t from itself at t + 1; then
replace ~kt+1 in the resulting expression with the RHS of (41). To get (40),
subtract (33) at t+1 from (3 ), then replace~xt+1 in the resulting expression
with the RHS of (42).
This system can be rewritten in matrix form as
Vt+1 = AVt +B + t+1;
where
V = (x^; k^;~x;k^)-;
 =
0BB@
 
1 +
aCt   11 +aCt+1
0
1
1 +
aCt+1    1 +aCt
 aCt
1CCA
-
;
and the coe cients of matrices A and B are obtained straightforwardly from
the above expressions.
3
It can be checked that, denoting by L the lag operator,
 = (1  L) 1(L)";
where (L) = 0+1L+2L
2; 0 = (  11 + ; 0; 11 + ; 0).; 1 = ( 1+ 1 + ; 0;  1+ 1 + ;  ).; 2 =
(   
1 +
; 0;  
1 +
;  ).:
Therefore,
Vt   EV = (I   A) 1(1  L) 1(L)"t
=
+/X
j=0
Aj0"t j +
+/X
j=1
Aj 1(1 + 0)"t j +
+/X
j=0
Aj
 
+/X
i=2
i( 1)"t i j
!
= Q(L)"t:
The last term can be computed as
P+
/
k=2(I A) 1(k 1I Ak 1)2( 1):
Altogether, this expansion allows us to get all the coe cients Qi of Q and
then to compute
V ar(V ) =
 
+/X
j=0
QiQ
.
i
!
2":
Furthermore,
EV = (I   A) 1B:
This allows us to get all the moments in (37). Next, to compute to
compute the moments of the equilibrium, we rewrite (3 )-(3 ) as well as the
law of motion for a as
vt+1 =Mvt + C +N"t + Zt;
where v = (x; k; a).: The variance-covariance matrix of the cyclical compo-
nent in v; 
; is solution to

 =M
M . +NN .2":
By rewriting (24) as yt = Dvt + E; we then compute detrended output
volatility as 2y = D
D
.:
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7.4 Proof of Proposition 3
The characteristic equation for the eigenvalues of matrix A is
x2   x(Q+ ) + 
1 + 
= 0;
where
Q = 1 +

(1 + )(1  ) :
Note that if the roots are complex their common module is
 

1+
1=2
< 1:
Therefore the dynamics are stable. Let us characterize this regime rst.
Roots are complex i¤
(Q+ )2 <
4
1 + 
: (43)
This will be the case provided  lies between the roots of
h() = 2Q2 + 2

Q   2
1 + 

+ 2 = 0:
We note that if Q   2
1+
< 0 and if these roots are real, they are both
positive, and one of them is lower than one since their product is 2 < 1:
Furthermore, h(1) = Q2+
 
2Q   4
1+

+2 = (Q+)2  4
1+
= (1  1
1+
)2 > 0:
Therefore both roots, if they exist are between 0 and 1:
Next, we note that Q =

1 + 
(1+)(1 )

1
1+
 
1  
1 

; which, if it is
positive, is lower than

1 + 
(1 )

1
1+
 
1  
1 

< 1
1+
< 2
1+
: Thus we
always have that Q   2
1+
< 0: Next, the roots are real if and only if
Q   2
1 + 
2
> 2Q2;
or equivalently
2
1 + 
 Q > jjQ:
This clearly always holds for   0: Furthermore, for  > 0; it is equiv-
alent to Q < 1
1+
; which we ust proved above. This proves that for any ;
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there exists an interior interval of values of  included in [0; 1] ; [ c (); 
+
c ()];
over which (43) holds and therefore the eigenvalues of A are complex. Fur-
thermore, we can check that for  = 0; Q = 1 and  = 1=(1 + ); and we
have a double root equal to 1. On the other hand for  !1; we have Q!
1 + 
1 
and  !   
1 
; and we get the double root  =Q = 
1 +
: Hence
the banana-shaped lens on Figure 1.
Let us now turn to the regime where the eigenvalues are real, i.e. where
(43) is violated. We have to distiguinsh between two cases.
Case 1
(Q+ ) > 0:
This inequality holds i¤
 >
   (1  )
(1 + )(1  ) +  = pos():
This denes a threshold for  which is increasing in  and converges to

1 +
as  !1: Then both eigenvalues are positive, and the largest one is
x1 =
Q+  +
p

2
;
where  = (Q+)2  4
1+
: For the system to be stable we need that x1 < 1;
i.e. p
 < 2  Q  :
A necessary condition is that 2   Q     0: This is equivalent to
  (1+2)(1 )+
(1+)(1 )+
; which always holds since the RHS is  1: Given that, the
preceding inequality holds i¤
 = (Q+ )2   4
1 + 
< (2  Q  )2 ;
or equivalently
  
1 + 
< 1  (Q+ );
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but
1  (Q+ ) = 1  + (1  ) 
(1 + )(1  )  
1
1 + 
>   
1 + 
:
This proves that dynamics are stable in the zone where the eigenvalues
are positive.
Next, note that at the frontier of this zone, we have Q+ = 0; implying
that (43) holds. Therefore,
 c () < pos() < 
+
c () for pos() > 0:
This means that for  > (1   )=; the eigen values are complex, and
stable, for  c () <  < 
+
c (); and positive, and stable for  > 
+
c (); while
they are negative for  <  c (): On the other hand, for  < (1   )=; the
eigenvalues are complex and stable for  c () <  < 
+
c (); and positive and
stable for  <  c () and  > 
+
c ():
Case 2
(Q+ ) < 0;
i.e.
 <
   (1  )
(1 + )(1  ) +  :
Then both roots are negative, and the largest one in absolute value is
x2 =
Q+   p
2
:
We have x2 >  1 i¤ p
 < 2 + Q+ :
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A necessary condition is 2 + Q +   0: This necessary condition is
satised i¤
     (1  )(3 + 2)
(1 + )(1  ) +  :
If this condition is violated, the dynamics are necessarily unstable. If it
holds, then they are stable if
 < (2 + Q+ )2 :
This is equivalent to
  
1 + 
< 1 + Q+ ;
or equivalently
 >
   (2 + )(1  )
 + (2 + )(1  ) = stab(): (44)
We note that
   (1  )(3 + 2)
(1 + )(1  ) +  < stab() < pos():
Furthemore, at  = stab() > 0; we have that   1+ = 1 + Q + ;
implying that (Q+ )2 =
 
1 + 
1+
2
> 4
1+
: Therefore (43) holds, implying
(since stab() < pos() < 
+
c ()), that we must have
stab() < 
 
c ():
Therefore, if  > 3(1 )
 2(1 )
; the eigenvalues are negative and unstable for
 < stab(); negative and stable for stab() <  < 
 
c (); complex and
stable for  c () <  < 
+
c (); and positive and stable for  > 
+
c (): On the
other hand, if 1 

<  < 3(1 )
 2(1 )
; the eigenvalues are negative and stable
for  <  c (); complex and stable for 
 
c () <  < 
+
c (); and positive and
stable for  > +c ():
This completes the proof of Proposition 3.
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7.5 Computing welfare in the case with memory
We rewrite the dynamical system as
xt+1 = cxt + (1  c)x^t
x^t+1 = (  (1  )(1  c)) x^t   (1  )cxt
 (1  )
2
m
4
( 1 +
p
1 + 4=d) +
1  
1   (ln + at+1) ;
where c =

 1+
p
1+4=d
1+
p
1+4=d

:
Let ut = xt   ~xt and vt = x^t   ~xt: Let yt = (ut vt)2: Then
yt+1 = Ayt + wt+1;
where
A =

c 1  c
 (1  )c   (1  )(1  c)

and
wt+1 =
 
  1
1 +
(at+1   at)
  (1 )2m
4
( 1 +
p
1 + 4=d) +  (1+)
1 +
(at+1   at)
!
:
We have that
Ew =
 
  g
1 +
  (1 )2m
4
( 1 +
p
1 + 4=d) + g( (1+))
1 +
!
and
Ey = (I   A) 1Ew:
Let w^ = a  Ew and y^ = y   Ey: Then y^t+1 = Ay^t + w^t: Furthermore,
w^t+1 =
 
  1
1 +
 (1+)
1 +
!
((  1)aCt + "t+1):
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This allows us to compute the following quantities
Ew^aC =
 
  1
1 +
 (1+)
1 +
! 
(  1)2a + 2"

=
 
  1
1 +
 (1+)
1 +
!
2"
1 + 
:
Ey^aC = (I   A) 1Ew^aC :
Ey^tw^
3
t+1 = (1  )Ey^aC( 11 +    (1+)1 + ) =M:
Ew^w^3 = ((1  )2 2a + 2")
 
  1
1 +
 (1+)
1 +
!
  1
1 +
 (1+)
1 +

=
22"
1 + 
 
  1
1 +
 (1+)
1 +
!
  1
1 +
 (1+)
1 +

= N:
We then get that the variance-covariance matrix of y^; V; is the solution
to the linear equation
V = AV A3 +N + AM +M 3A3;
which can be solved by vectorization.
The asymptotic social welfare is then given by (17), i.e.
 E(2
4
+ (1 + )(xt   ~xt)2) =  2
4
  (1 + ) [(Ey)1 + V11] :
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7.6 Regression results for estimating the persistence
parameter
Country 7 S.E. N R2
Australia 0.2 0.11 0 0.19
Austria 0. 0.12 0 0. 3
Belgium 0.3 0.12 0 0.4
Canada 0.32 0.12 0 0.2
Denmark 0.38 0.12 0 0. 1
Finland 0. 7 0.11 0 0. 4
France 0. 1 0.11 0 0.71
Germany 0.20 0.17 40 0.4
Greece 0.78 0.09 9 0.
Iceland 0.34 0.14 4 0.2
Ireland 0. 4 0.11 0 0.49
Italy 0.72 0.08 0 0.77
apan 0.74 0.08 0 0.7
orea 0.3 0.14 47 0.22
Country 7 S.E. N R2
Netherlands 0.42 0.12 0 0. 2
New ealand 0.3 0.13 0 0.18
Norway 0.4 0.12 0 0. 3
Portugal 0.07 0.14 0 0.18
Spain 0. 8 0.09 0 0.71
Sweden 0.37 0.12 0 0.
Switzerland 0. 0.1 0 0. 9
United ingdom 0.48 0.11 0 0.41
United States 0.00 0.18 0 0.11
Table A1 Regression results for estimating the persistence parameter in
the aggregate labor/capital ratio. The specication that was estimated for
each country was x = 7x( 1)+a0w( 1)+a1a( 1)+a2e( 1)+C;
with  denoting the rst di¤erence operator, x = lnL=K; w = lnW=L;
a = lnA; e = lnRER: The data used was the Penn World Table, with a
TFP L = Total yearly hours worked number of persons engaged
44
average annual hours worked, K Total capital stock (national accounts),
w = real wage ( share of labor compensation (national accounts) real GDP
(national accounts) / total hours worked), RER = real exchange rate price
level of GDP, PPP, output side, US 200 1. Estimation was conducted by
country, and countries outside the OECD or with fewer than 40 observations
were dropped.
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Figure 1 -- Effect of the variance of aggregate shocks on the optimal selectivity level   
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Figure 2 -- Effect of the mutational variance on optimal selectivity  
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